Arab Spring Light

- The Protests in Jordan

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1. Arab Spring Light – The Protests in Jordan

Although it did not experience large scale protests like Tunisia or Egypt, Jordan proved not to be immune against the “virus of the Arab Spring” infecting most countries in the MENA region in one way or the other. Yet, what differentiates Jordanian protests from others in the region is their considerably smaller size and their limited demands. Jordanians, unlike their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, have been calling for reforms and the downfall of the government (hukuma) rather than the regime\(^1\) (nizam) (Hamid/Freer 2011:4). No large scale violence was employed against the protestors and although going on until today, protests in Jordan decreased over time. Hence, the storm that turned a whole region upside down left Jordan relatively unshattered. This paper therefore seeks to shed light on why regime stability\(^2\) was maintained by analysing two periods in time, both contributing to regime stability in Jordan. First, the strategies of regime maintenance prior to the protests have to be analysed to assess why protestors did not challenge the monarchy. Second, the strategies during the protests have to be analyzed to assess why the protests were contained. The already low intensity of protests and their containment both contribute in my opinion to regime stability in Jordan. Thus, I have to answer the following research questions: 1) Why did the protestors not challenge the Hashemite monarchy? and 2) Why could the protests in Jordan be contained?

To answer these questions, I draw on the concept of authoritarian upgrading which claims that authoritarian regimes endure as long as the rulers successfully adopt certain strategies of adaptation to political, economic or social challenges (e.g. Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004; Heydemann 2007). I offer a theory-based explanation\(^3\) of the Jordanian case by arguing that the same strategies preventing a challenge to the monarchy contributed to the containment of protests. Yet, I take into account that some strategies might have failed making protests possible in the first place\(^4\) and preventing their complete abandonment until today.

The paper will be structured as follows: first, I give an overview over Jordan’s political, economic and social fabric and the characteristics of the 2011 protests (Chapt. 2). Second, I discuss the limits and requirements of a theory-based explanation, present the concept of authoritarian upgrading, critically discuss it and frame my variables and hypotheses in a way that will allow for clear-cut analysis (Chapt. 3). Third, I confront them with the Jordanian case to analyse if the strategies predicted by the theory were in fact employed before and during the protests (Chapt. 4). Finally, I will present and critically discuss my findings (Chapt. 5).

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1 A regime is according to Schmitter/Karl (1991) “an ensemble of patterns that determines the methods of access to the principal public offices; the characteristics of the actors admitted to or excluded from such access; the strategies that actors may use to gain access; and the rules that are followed in the making of publicly binding decisions.”

2 This refers to the probability that a regime remains in place in the foreseeable future (definition as discussed in the seminar).

3 The limits as well as requirements for such an approach will be discussed in Chapter 3.

4 Yet, why protest erupted is not the issue here since this would require taking into account regional factors as well.
2. Presenting the Case - The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Protests in 2011

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy. The King appoints and dismisses the prime minister, the cabinet as well as the parliament by calling for elections. The constitution ensures that the King is “immune from any liability and responsibility” (Constitution, Art. 30; Hamid/Freer 2011:4). The reigning king, Abdallah II, ascended the throne in 1999 after the death of his father, King Hussein. Other important institutions exercising official and unofficial political influence are the Royal Court and the General Intelligence Department which “continued to influence decisions in most aspects of Jordanian public life, including academic freedom [and] government appointments” (Human Rights Watch 2011:1). Formal institutions like the parliament are weak and have little influence. Freedom House classified Jordan in 2011 as “not free” while the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2010 democracy index placed it among the authoritarian states (Hamid/Freer 2011:1). Torture is widespread, as is arbitrary and administrative detention. Criticism of the King is heavily punished under the penal code (Human Rights Watch 2011:2).

Jordan's economy is among the smallest in the region, with insufficient supplies of water, oil, and other resources, causing a heavy reliance on foreign assistance (CIA Factbook Jordan). Of 6.5 million Jordanians, over 50 per cent are of Palestinian origin. Although most Palestinians who came to Jordan as refugees in 1947/48 received Jordanian citizenship, there have always been underlying tensions between the so called “Transjordanians” and “Palestinian-Jordanians”. The traditional social contract prescribed different roles for these groups: while the state apparatus, especially the security forces, consists of Transjordanians, the private sector is largely controlled by Palestinians (Vogt 2011:63). According to Brand, the largely Transjordanian-staffed army and security forces on the one hand and the Palestinian business elite are the main pillars of regime support (Brand 1995:49). Note, however, that Transjordanians and Palestinians alike are afflicted by economic deprivation that was in large parts the reason for the outbreak of protests in 2011 since both groups encompass members of various economic classes (Helfont/Helfont 2011:86).

Protests are no recent phenomenon in Jordan. Successive protest waves took place in the last twenty years, some sparked by political events and some by economic deprivation (Ottaway/Hamzawy 2011:4). In January 2011, protests first erupted in the impoverished town of Dhiban over unemployment and rising fuel as well as food prices. The main demands of the protestors were the removal of Prime Minister Samir Rifā‘I as well as economic reforms. Protests soon spread all over the country and especially to the capital Amman. Recent events

5 The Transjordanian identity relies on tribal affiliations and their role within state institutions (Brand 1995:48).
in Tunisia and Egypt and the eruption of protests in traditionally “loyalist” areas raised concerns among the monarchy. On February 1, the King reacted by dismissing the Rifa’i government and appointing Marouf al Bakhit, a former prime minister, to form a new government and to take the necessary steps towards reform (Muasher 2011:3). Still, protests especially in Amman continued with thousands of participants until March when one protestors was killed and more than 100 wounded during what was described as an intervention of security forces in a clash between pro-monarchy and pro-reform protesters (The Guardian 13/06/11). Afterwards, the protests stopped for a while and then continued due to the failure of the reform process to deliver tangible results. Bakhit was replaced by Awn al-Khasawneh, a former judge at the International Court of Justice and Jordan’s third prime minister in 2011 (Ammonnews 24/10/11). While the size of the protests decreased over time, they are still going on with some hundred participants (see e.g. Jordan Times 10/02/12).

Like in many other Arab countries, protests in Jordan were mainly fuelled by economic hardship. As a survey showed, 61 per cent of the population, Transjordanians and Palestinians alike, claimed high prices, unemployment rates (12.5 %, 27 % among youth) and poverty (14.2 % under poverty line) as the country’s top priorities (Pecher Poll 2010:11). According to reports, the majority of protestors were Transjordanians rather than Palestinians (Schenker/Pollock 2011:2). Professional associations, leftist parties and young activist played an important role at the beginning of the protests (Ottaway/Hamzawy 2011:10). The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), joined the protests on January 21 and contributed to the protests’ politicization by adding demands for political reforms (ibid. 11). None of the protestors asked for the end of the Hashemite monarchy. They were in fact eager to demonstrate their loyalty, as for example the Secretary-General of the IAF, Hamza Mansour, who claimed that the Islamists “recognize and acknowledge the legitimacy of the Hashemites” (Schenker/Pollock 2011:2). Demands included the removal of the Rifa’i government, the fight against corruption, unemployment and poverty. Also political demands came forward as protestors chanted “we want a fair electoral law” and “people want an elected government” (The Guardian 25/02/11).

3. Authoritarian Upgrading – Methodology, Theory, Variables and Hypotheses

Theory-based approaches have certain limits that impact on this paper’s procedural method. First, “a case-explaining inquiry does not test theories, although the evidence collected could also be used to check a theory’s validity” (Van Evera 1997:75). Second, to be valid, an explanation has to be an example of a valid general theory. Before concluding that x causes y in a specific case, one has to assess the general relationship of variables outlined by the
theory’s hypotheses. Such an approach is termed generalized specific explanation.\textsuperscript{6} If the underlying theory is false, the specific explanation based on it cannot be valid (ibid. 40-41). This is insofar a limitation as in social science and especially when a theory is formulated as fuzzy as the concept of authoritarian upgrading, it is impossible to state its general validity. Thus, any explanation based on such a theory might be proven wrong when the theory itself is falsified. Yet, by making the assumed relationship of variables explicit and thus allowing for the theory’s evaluation, I make my explanation as transparent as possible.

Authoritarian upgrading is no homogenous theory but rather a concept mapping strategies rulers use to react to different challenges. As it does not prescribe clear-cut variables, I have to critically evaluate the literature on authoritarian upgrading to derive my variables and hypotheses. I framed some of them differently to make them more distinctive from one another, yet, including all factors considered important in literature. No conclusions on causality or qualitative differences between variables can be made as the literature on authoritarian upgrading gives no clear indications regarding this topic.

As I presented two research questions, there are two dependent variables (DV$s$). DV$\text{-before}$ is \textit{no challenge to the regime}; for the second, the DV$\text{-during}$ is \textit{containment of protests}. Both are dichotomous variables and because I am not testing a theory but am explaining an outcome that I already accounted for in the sections above, the values of the two DV$s$ are given: “yes-no challenge to the regime” and “yes-containment of protests”. Authoritarian upgrading helps to shed light on these two explananda: its premise is that regime stability in the MENA region despite economic, social and political challenges, especially demands for democratization and economic reform, is not the result of repression (whose degree has remained stable in the last decades (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:375)) but of strategies of adaptation to those challenges (ibid.; Bank 2004; Heydemannn 2007). Authors outline different strategies, often describing the same mechanisms.\textsuperscript{7} I therefore identify the most prevalent ones and group them into categories of strategies that will serve as my overall independent variables (IV$s$). I outline two overall IV$s$ that I consider to be distinct regarding their purposes and subsume different strategies serving the same purpose. A first category of strategies, and thus my first IV, is \textit{strategies of legitimation}. Legitimation is defined as efforts of the rulers to achieve

\textsuperscript{6} A generalized specific explanation is superior to a nongeneralized specific explanation that does not identify the general theory and thus, does not allow for to evaluation of the underlying theory (Van Evera 1997:41).

legitimacy, understood as the acceptance\(^8\) of the rulers’ claim to rule in the eyes of the population, certain groups or individuals (Josua 2011:3-4). Since authoritarian regimes, by definition, lack democratic legitimacy, the search for legitimacy is at the core of their survival strategies (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004: 372) and all authors consider it an important strategy while listing also others that they consider separate from legitimation. Yet, while critically reviewing these strategies, it became obvious to me that e.g. strategies like “imitative” institution building and cooptation (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004) are rather subcategories of legitimation than rivalling strategies. I want to make this relationship clearer by subsuming them under the overall IV-1. Most legitimation strategies have both an internal and external dimension.\(^9\) Internal legitimacy is the explicit or diffuse acceptance of a ruler by society. External legitimacy is the extent a ruler is accepted by external powers (ibid. 376). Legitimation has also different addressees, the political elite or larger parts of society that require different patterns of legitimation (Bank 2004:160-161).

It is discussed whether cooptation is part of legitimation or not (Josua 2011:3). Cooptation is understood as “the capacity to bind strategic actors to the ruling regime by making use of informal (e.g. patrimonial rule) and formal (e.g. parties) mechanisms” (Gerschwaski 2010:8). While I agree that this is part of legitimation (especially because I define legitimacy as mere acceptance), the definition already makes clear that cooptation takes different forms and cuts across the strategies I will outline below in a way that cooptation is a mechanism used within those strategies. It does however not constitute them exclusively or is a separate category of legitimation strategies.\(^10\) The concept of cooptation, however, is useful to my analysis as it is targeted either at strengthening or widening the rulers’ support base (Josua 2011:3).

Strategies of legitimation encompass the following:

*Traditional legitimation* (IV-1-1) is a mechanism evoked mainly by Arab monarchies who base their claim to rule on tradition, religion or emanation (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:377) and the idea of “the sanctity of age-old rules and powers” (Weber 1947).

*Material legitimation* (IV-1-2) by allocating resources is important (Bank 2004:159) but of course highly dependent on their availability. Material legitimation targeting the society as a whole is based on the “no taxation without representation” principle (Josua 2011:8). Also specific groups can be targeted by allocating certain benefits and rents.

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\(^8\) In a narrower definition, legitimacy is understood as the belief of the addressee of legitimation in the rule of an incumbent. Yet, I think it is not necessary to honestly believe in a leader to support him and his rule. People might support him due to benefits they get or because he fulfills certain tasks better than alternative leaders.

\(^9\) Of course, the focus here is on internal legitimacy but external legitimacy does play a role as it is linked to the influx of foreign aid that can then be used to stabilize ones rule. Also, a positive image of the ruler abroad can (but does not have to) increase internal legitimacy because the rulers can claim to ensure good foreign relations.

\(^10\) E.g. granting economic benefits to a certain group (material legitimation) to keep them loyal is cooptation as well as appointing them to political office (inclusionary legitimation) with the same goal.
Legal-formal legitimation (IV-1-3) (ibid.5) includes the proliferation of formal institutions by establishing ministries, parliamentary bodies, political parties, etc. Note, however, that these “imitative” institutions perform completely different functions than in democracies and are merely used as arenas of voicing public opinion, as a way to coopt the opposition or to rubberstamp political decisions. IV-1-3 also includes the establishment of new rules and procedures such as constitutional reform or economic liberalization (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:380). This strategy fosters both internal and external legitimacy by simulating political competition and contestation where there is in fact none. Attention is diverted from mostly informal institutions where actual political decision-making is taking place (ibid. 2004:382).

Symbolic legitimation (IV-1-4) refers to discourses and symbolic acts that are part of the ruler’s narrative strategy to ensure legitimacy by staving off demands before they become prevalent (Bank 2004:160).

Inclusionary legitimation (IV-1-5). Rulers recruit personnel not because of their capabilities but to ensure their loyalty. Also, oppositional groups are included as long as they accept the ruler’s power claim (ibid.160). Inclusion takes often place via formal institutions like parliament, creating networks and loyalties as well as channels for upward social mobility (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:383-384). Inclusion can both broaden the ruler’s support base by including new actors and strengthen it by bringing existing elites closer to the ruler.

Legitimation by threat (IV-1-6). Internally, the ruler will create a scenario of chaos in case the regime collapses scaring people into supporting him as the lesser of two evils. Externally, rulers draw on foreign interests, especially security interests, by evoking that, without him, regional stability is at stake or terrorism or migration will increase. Thereby, they gain acceptance by foreign governments as important allies.

While legitimation is always at the core of explaining regime stability, another mechanism is in my opinion at work in authoritarian regimes. I thereby refer to strategies described by authors as “elite rotation” (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:375), “appropriating and containing civil societies” (Heydemann 2007:5) or “exclusion” (Bank 2004:155). Their aim is not to legitimize the regime but to prevent potential alternative power bases from developing (ibid.157) and challenging the regime. I call this category strategies of divide-and-rule defined as non-repressive, non-violent strategies that aim at fragmenting and weakening the opposition: Elite rotation (IV-2-1) refers to the reshuffling of elites from one post to another to ensures that no individual or coalition can become strong enough to develop an independent power base (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:379).
Exacerbating societal cleavages (IV-2-2) fragments the opposition along religious, ethnic, ideological or other cleavages. Pitting one group against another limits cooperation among them and maximizes the ruler’s room for political manoeuvre (Brumberg 2002:61).

Undermining oppositional demands (IV-2-3) by turning them into the ruler’s own agenda intends to pull the rug out from under the opposition. It helps the regime to denunciate the opposition as mere troublemakers, thereby stripping them of public support, if they don’t buy into the rulers’ promises to implement their demands and keep on demanding true reforms.

Structural restrictions (IV-2-4) refer to legal frameworks fragmenting and controlling political opposition (Heydemann 2007:11).

Based on these variables, I formulate two hypotheses, each one referring to one of my two research questions that will be in the following confronted with empirical evidence:

Hypothesis 1 (H-1): Since the Hashemite rulers successfully employed strategies of legitimation and divide-and-rule in the past, they possess legitimacy and an undisputed power base within Jordan preventing them from being openly challenged by the protestors.

Hypothesis 2 (H-2): Since the Jordanian rulers employed legitimation and divide-and-rule strategies, they were able to contain the protests.

As I assume that same overall strategies were employed in the analysed periods, I look at the same IVs for both of them. Since authoritarian upgrading at least hints to a causal link between strategies of upgrading and regime maintenance, I have to show that such causal links exist in any case possible (although this might be difficult). If this is the case and if the same strategies were employed, I can confirm the explanation offered by my hypotheses.

4. Analysis of the Jordanian Case

I try to show that authoritarian upgrading successfully took place in Jordan before and during the protests. Although data is scarce, I will show as many causal links as possible by relying on surveys and mapping the reaction of the target groups to those strategies.

4.1 Strategies of Authoritarian Upgrading before the Protests

The Jordanian monarchy has been remarkably stable in the past three decades (Mednicoff 2002:91). Even in the eyes of public protest in early 2011, none of the protestors challenged the Hashemite monarchy directly (DV-before “yes – no challenge to the regime”). To explain this, I analyse if strategies of authoritarian upgrading were successfully employed right up to the beginning of the protests. Note that some measures have multiple purposes and might thus be addressed under several strategies.

11 For example, if a certain measure by the rulers was followed by a reaction of the protestors, this would at least be a hint that a correlation between a certain strategy and scale down of protests exists.
Strategies of Legitimation: Traditional legitimation (IV-1-1). The Jordanian monarchy possesses legitimacy first and foremost due to traditional religious legitimation. Tracing back their origins through Islamic lineage to Prophet Mohammad provides the Hashemites with an incontestable source of legitimacy and gives them quasi-religious authority rendering criticism against them equal to blasphemy (Milton-Edwards 1993:192; Schlumberger 2010:241). Moreover, they emphasize their local roots by playing up their role in the Great Arab Revolt of 1916 (Mednicoff 2002:1000) when Sharif Al-Hussein bin Ali (Abdallah II’s great-great-grandfather) led the uprise against the Ottomans. The Emirate of Transjordan, founded in 1921, became the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan upon formal independence from Britain in 1946 when the link between the Hashemites and the state was documented in the state’s very name (King Hussein Website; Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:377).

This strategy was successful: blogger and activist Naseem Tarawnah states that “loyalty to the King is seen as loyalty to the country. They are intertwined and people some times have difficulty separating the two” (Black Iris 23/01/11). Even the opposition proclaims its loyalty like e.g. the IAF who expressed “the party’s belief in the legitimacy of the Hashemites, noting that it was a religious duty to preserve the stability of the Kingdom” (Susser 2011:5).

Material legitimation (I-1-2). The rulers ensure legitimacy by creating public sector jobs and allocating money to the population. Because of its limited resources, the Kingdom has relied on aid inflows from abroad to be able to employ “top down” allocation (Choucair 2006:4). That material legitimation was crucial for legitimacy is exemplified by the rulers’ reluctance to fully privatize state entities despite economic liberalization programmes. Full privatization would have led to the dismissal of workers from previously state-owned enterprises (Bank/Schlumberger 2004:51); this would have jeopardized peoples’ acceptance of the rulers and was thus avoided. Yet, material legitimation became more and more difficult for the Jordanian elites. Despite efforts to promote foreign direct investment, little has actually materialized (Bank 2004:161). Jordan also was deeply affected by the global financial crisis. GDP growth decreased and the budget deficit got close to $2 billion. To counter the deficit, the Rifa’i government reduced subsidies on fuel and food which led to dramatic price increases. The erosion of material legitimation combined with unemployment rates, poverty and corruption were the most important reasons for the protests in early 2011. Thus, material legitimation was successful in the past but became less and less feasible leading to economic distress, decreasing legitimacy and bringing people to the streets.

Legal-formal legitimation (IV-1-3) as a survival strategy has been a common response to popular discontent in Jordan (Lucas 2005:137, 141). The ruling elite reacted to widespread
protest in 1989 by initiating a first wave of “imitative” institution building (Ottaway/Hamzawy 2011:4): elections and parliamentary activity was reintroduced in 1989. Yet, the election laws of 1989, 1993 and 2001 were designed in a way that allowed the regime to control the parliament’s composition while keeping the electoral process legitimate in the eyes of the voters and the international community. Furthermore, the parliament was created as a weak institution serving only to rubberstamp the rulers’ decisions and to allocate rents among the elite (which has not changed until today). Next, the National Charter and the Political Parties Law of 1992 legalized political parties that have until today, however, little impact on policy decisions, are highly factionalized and function as a loyal opposition without strong agendas (Ryan 2010:315). A large number of NGOs got official authorization, too; yet, they often are affiliated with state institutions and are not able to work independently. Another strategy is the formation of committees on specific topics showcasing the rulers’ commitment to positive change but with little to no impact on political decision-making. Legal-formal legitimation was employed to simulate political pluralism to Jordanians and to international donors that did, however, not result in any actual possibility for contesting political power. Real power does not rest within constitutional institutions but within the security services and the Royal Court which are not accountable to the parliament or regulated by the constitution (Choucair 2006:4). That legal-formal legitimation was successful more externally than internally is exemplified by e.g. a statement of former US-president George W. Bush who, in 2003, said about King Abdallah II “He's a reformer who's working to build a country that is tolerant and modern and prosperous” (Speech Bush 18/09/2003). Internally, yet, people are aware of the weakness of parliament, vote rigging and self-interest of their MPs which they see as “a bunch of tribal rent-seekers” (quoted in Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:383). Whether that translates into delegitimation of the monarchy or just the parliamentarians cannot be concluded for sure as the royal family managed to be perceived as being outside the political fray (see IV-1-4 above).

Symbolic legitimation (IV-1-4) in Jordan includes several mechanisms: the use of democratic language or discourses to distract from undemocratic rule, symbolic acts and decisions, and the framing of the royal family as above the political fray. Democratic language was used by Abdallah II right after his accession to the throne: he proclaimed that the country’s democratic reform course would remain a “national and unwavering choice” (Choucair 2006:8). That this was merely rhetoric became clear with the new King’s priority on economic reform. Still, he kept on affirming his intensions for democratic reform not only in his speeches but also with declarations of intent like e.g. the 2006 National Agenda which included very explicit
proposals on modernization and economic liberalisation but only very vague notions of political change. Also the King often stressed the need to amend the electoral law and political parties law but no steps were actually taken (ibid. 9). The King also employed discourses intending to distract from the lack of political reform since talking democracy without results would have harmed his credibility in the long run. In fact, in the beginning of his reign, the King chose a discourse focusing on economic and technological development for Jordan. This became evident in the ‘New Jordan (al urdun al gadid)’ publicity campaign that expressed the King’s wish to make Jordan a model for the region in terms of economic development. This strategy was functional in two aspects: first, it helped to set aside political topics as conflicting with the overall goal of economic development (e.g. issues like human rights that had been prevalent were largely removed from the public agenda). Second, the discourse focusing on economic liberalization enhanced Jordan’s image abroad (Bank 2004:165; Bank/Schlumberger 2004:50).

When security issues became prevalent due to the second intifada and the crisis in Iraq, the King changed to a discourse on national interests. This was reflected in the ‘Jordan First (al urdun awwalan)’ campaign aiming at rallying Jordanians behind the flag to protect national interest (which wasn’t actually defined) (Bank 2004:165). These campaigns and discourses tried to distract from a lack of democratic reform or even to show that such reforms would collide with more pressing goals, e.g. economic development and national security.

Another discursive tool was used to ensure the legitimacy of the royal family and to prevent criticism: despite their clear direct involvement in running the affairs of the state, the royal family has portrayed itself as non-partisan and above the political fray. Also the fact that the media can openly criticize policies and behaviour of the ‘government’ without risking reprisal from the King supports the idea that the King is outside the political arena (Mednicoff 2002:101). This allows the King to divert criticism and blame unpopular decisions on the government. The frequent exchange of governments as reaction to popular discontent can also be viewed as a symbolic act because it never changes the political landscape. It is again a tool to portray the King’s responsiveness to public demands by using politicians as scapegoats for political and economic aberrations without having to take responsibility.

Symbolic legitimation ensured legitimacy: the royals are seen internally as apolitical servants of the people and by the West as Arab ‘moderates’ and reformers: Barack Obama e.g. praised the King in 2008: “Jordan’s leadership is a source of pride for its own people. I have long admired King Abdullah’s example of moderation and modernization” (NYTimes 22/07/08).
Inclusionary legitimation (IV-1-5). Under Abdallah II, neoliberal business elite were more and more included into the regime elites: The King created the Economic Consultative Council (ECC) as an institutionalized stepping-stone for young, Western-oriented business men. Via the ECC, they gradually acquired offices in the government. Political elites were mainly coopted through the parliament (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:383). The Parliament is the regime’s prime instruments for allocating rent and buying opposition figures. The Jordanian regime even managed to coopt the Islamist movements into the institutionalized opposition. The MB of Jordan “acted largely as a body of loyal opposition, doing little if anything to actually threaten the status quo of Hashemite hegemony” (Milton-Edwards 2006:182; also Ryan 2010:318). This was reflected in their demands at the beginning of the protests where they, despite their political demands to establish a true constitutional monarchy, pledged their allegiance to the royal family. Yet, one can see that this inclusionary strategy towards the MB was only semi-successful since they, despite not challenging the monarchy, voiced criticism and took to the streets in 2011. Inclusionary legitimation ensured the acceptance of the rulers by economic or political elites and served to either strengthening the support base by promoting certain figures or to broaden the support base by bringing new elites into the system. This has been more successful in some cases than in others.

Legitimation by threat (IV-1-6). The Hashemites portray themselves as indispensable for Jordan’s well being because of their claimed role as mediators between rivalling groups, e.g. Northern tribes vs. Southern tribes, Palestinians vs. Transjordanians. It is stipulated that without the royal family, Jordan would head directly into chaos and the aforementioned rivalries would lead to violent power struggles. Also, there is much at stake for elites but also ordinary people if the current regime would cease to exist (Black Iris 23/01/11).

This strategy was successful as it is frequently pointed out by Jordanians that without the Hashemites there would be a violent power struggle over power in Jordan. Even the opposition sees it that way: as Naseem Tarawnah points out: “even opponents have seen the Hashemite regime as the thing that holds this all together” (Time 17.06.11; Hamid/Freer 2011:4). Especially Transjordanians have a latent fear that, in a truly democratic state, they will lose political power to the Palestinian Jordanian majority (Helfont/Helfont 2011:86). Thus, they say a monarch is needed who can mediate between separate groups (Time 17.06.11) and does not press too strongly for democratic reforms, like a truly representative elections law. Keeping up the threat of a Jordan without monarchy ensures its legitimacy.

Concerning external legitimacy, the rulers have frequently played on Western and their neighbor’s fears of a destabilization of the region in case the monarchy would be overthrown.
For example, Jordan’s long borders with Iraq and Israel make internal stability highly important for the US. By portraying the monarchy as the only bulwark against Islamism and terrorism, the Western fears were used to ensure external legitimacy.

Because this strategy was successful, Jordan enjoys better access to Western markets, material and monetary aid (Jordan is the second largest per capita recipient of US aid (Hamid/Freer 2011:1)) than many other autocracies with similarly small economies (Mednicoff 2002:103). Legitimation by threat has caused Jordanians and external powers to accept and even actively support the Jordanian regime because it seems to them the lesser evil.

To conclude, the Jordanian rulers employed different strategies of legitimation that led to the legitimacy of the monarchy among Jordanians but also among foreign actors. That legitimation strategies were in general (although not always) successful is e.g. shown by a opinion poll conducted in late 2010 (Pecher Poll 2010) showing high support for the King and the royal family: “asked to name their most admired national leader, 31 percent of East Bankers and 21 percent of Palestinian-origin respondents cited King Abdullah. Queen Rania, of Palestinian origin herself, garnered an additional 9 percent of East Banker and 13 percent of Palestinian votes. The royal family as a whole was named by fully 65 percent of East Bankers, and by an unexpectedly high 56 percent of Palestinians” (Schenker/Pollock 2011:2).

IV-2 Strategies of divide-and-rule\textsuperscript{12}: Elite rotation (IV-2-1). Jordan is a prime example of elite rotation as a strategy of regime maintenance (Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004:379): since its independence in 1946, the country has seen seventy different prime ministers (Schenker/Pollock 2011). Individual ministers or entire cabinets have been dismissed by the King without ever changing the basic political structure significantly (Mednicoff 2002:101). The pool of recruitment, however, stays the same. Prime Ministers that were dismissed are reinstated or reshuffled to other official positions like Samir al-Rifa’i who was Prime Minister six times. Another example is Fayez Tarawneh, former prime minister and one of the most experienced politicians in Jordan. He was appointed chief of the Royal Court, one of the most influential and prestigious positions, but was ousted after disagreements behind the scene and appointed to the Senate, a post without much influence (Bank 2004:163).

It is unclear whether this strategy was successful because one cannot know what would have happened without elite rotation. Still, if the King’s power base had been fragmented and elites had appeared disunited, this would have made challenging the monarchy much more feasible because elites might have supported an uprise. This was definitely not the case in early 2011.

\textsuperscript{12} It is even more difficult to detect causal links between strategies of divide-and-rule and the fact that there was no challenge to the regime because it is difficult to assess how strong the opposition would have been if they would not have been constrained by the rulers over decades. I will at least provide an idea of how the impact of these strategies could be measured although the actual measurement goes beyond the scope of a seminar paper.
Exacerbating societal cleavages (IV-2-2). The Transjordanian-Palestinian issue is the societal cleavage used the most for dividing the population as well as opposition. Basically, Palestinian Jordanians are considered by Transjordanians to be “less Jordanian” and thus less loyal to the royal family and the state (Helfont/Helfont 2011:87). Another cleavage closely related to this divide is the common distinction between loyalists and disloyal opponents of the regime. The dominant frame here is that everybody who is not willing to openly show and manifest his or her loyalty to the King is deemed disloyal and a foe to national interest. An example are the recommendations King Abdallah II gave to the electorate before the 2003 elections: he asked the voters not to be ‘fooled by glittering slogans, ideologies or ideas that have been outdated and proved to be failures, not by promises, used by some to influence electorates … though doubting the soundness of the course, perturbing others and propagating fear of the future’. Pro-regime candidates, on the other hand, very depicted by him as being committed to the ‘higher national interest’ (quoted in Abdullah 2003:19-20).

This discourse has silenced many opposition figures with regards to criticising the monarchy because this is not considered criticism but an attack on the Kingdom’s national interest. It has also made cooperation among the opposition, especially between Transjordanians and Palestinians, difficult. This has rendered the Jordanian opposition weak and fragmented.

Undermining oppositional demands (IV-2-3). Again, the example of Abdallah’s strategy to frame oppositional demands as “glittering slogans, ideologies or ideas that have been outdated and proven to be failures” (quoted in Abdullah 2003:19-20) has to be mentioned here. Undermining oppositional demands also includes the King’s practice to make oppositional demands his own, e.g. calling himself for reforms. Although this does often not translate into legislation, the King can thereby claim to take care of these issues and that further protests by the opposition are only intended to disturb public order since, from his point of view, he is taking care of it. It also helps the King to be seen as the good guy promoting reform and blaming eventual failures to implement on the government. Lacking illustrative examples for this period\(^{13}\), this will be become clearer when assessing the strategies during the protests.

Structural restrictions (IV-2-4). Especially the events of September 11, 2001 served as a chance to limit freedoms in Jordan: freedom of media and association have been further limited, amendments to the penal code allow charges up to imprisonment for journalists who are “disrupting society’s basic norms by promoting deviation from what is right” and threaten the “integrity of the state” (quoted in Bank/Schlumberger 2004:53).

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\(^{13}\) One would have to map the political discourse and interactions between the regime elites and the opposition over several years in order to see how the King or others took over demands from the opposition and made them his own as well as how public opinion then changed. This goes beyond the scope of a seminar paper.
The elections law is designed to prevent the opposition from gaining seats in parliament: the 1993 elections law established uneven electoral districts favouring rural pro-regime constituencies over urban bases of the opposition (Ryan 2010:315). This did not change with the 2001 elections law (Ryan 2010:316) which is like the 1993 law still based on the principle of “one-person, one-vote”. This principle favours tribal candidates, the regime’s support base, and discriminates against large parties: forced to make only one choice, voters tended to pick the candidate that is familiar to them due to personal connections (Choucair 2006:7). This systemic disadvantage for organized groups which encourages the localization of electoral contests has prevented parties from consolidating into broader blocs. The regime furthermore restricted the parties by law from ties to non-Jordanian political organizations limiting opportunities for leftists, Arab nationalists, and even Islamists to create natural links across borders (Lucas 2005:138). Yet, also individual opposition groups are directly targeted: the political parties law of 1992 forbade the use of schools and religious buildings for political activities which targeted the MB who had its historical centres there (Fondren 2009:48). Thus, the possibility of political parties to mobilize against the regime is limited (Lucas 2005:138).

The parliament was further weakened with the growing influence of business men as brought forward by King Abdallah. The ECC has developed into a kind of ‘parallel government’ under direct control of the King (Bank 2004:163). This allowed him to counterbalance the conventional institutions ensuring their weakness and his ultimate control over political decision making. Also, the King can choose to dissolve the parliament or postpone elections. He used this as an instrument against Islamists gaining parliamentary seats in 2002 when he postponed elections for the second time explaining it with regional instability. The actual reason, however, was that the IAF was expected to gain more influence in the parliament and, although, the parliament is very weak anyways so Islamists gaining parliamentary seats wouldn’t change the basic political parameters in Jordan, they would constrain the King’s margin of action for both domestic and foreign politics. His strategy paid off: when elections took place later, the old electoral law that favours pro-regime areas at the expense of the opposition was applied and the IAF only gained 17 of 110 seats. Therefore, Abdallah II tried to limit their influence by a mixture of partial marginalisation via his constitutional rights and partial inclusion (see above) (Bank 2004:163-164).

There are also structural mechanisms keeping members of the elite in place: the corruption legislation was frequently used to get rid of elite members who had the potential to threaten the King’s hegemony over power. A prominent example is Samih Battikhi, the former head of the General Intelligence Department, who was very influential and thus, was perceived as
threat. Battikhi was dismissed by the King, replaced by a more loyal figure, charged with fraud and embezzlement and later sent to prison for four years (Bank 2004:162). According to Lucas (2005:137, 141), the resourceful use of constitutional rules was successful in keeping the fractious opposition from unifying their ranks. Thus, the regime successfully employed strategies of divide-and-rule as well as strategies of legitimation in the past. The Hashemite rule was not challenged by the protestors since the regime managed through these strategies to maintain broad based legitimacy and to weaken the political opposition to a point where it was not possible for them to present a credible challenge to the regime. That some of the strategies did not prove completely successful (e.g. material, legal-formal legitimation) could hint at why protests in 2011 could erupt at all.

4.2 Strategies of Authoritarian Upgrading during the Protests

Protests and their public support was contained (DV-during) to a minimum (although not completely, as protests go on until today). This is exemplified by a survey of the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)\textsuperscript{14} in May 2011 in which 80 percent of Jordanians said that they did not support the protests but only 9 percent claimed that the country enjoys “security and stability and the situation does not require demonstration” (survey (originally in Arabic) cited in Helfont/Helfont 2011:90). Thus, the protests were not supported\textsuperscript{15} although only few Jordanians are completely satisfied with the conditions in the Kingdom. Thus, I will take a look at the success of strategies of authoritarian upgrading.

IV-1 Strategies of Legitimation: Traditional legitimation (IV-1-1). King Abdallah II resorted to mass demonstrations of loyalty to underpin the legitimacy of the Hashemite monarchy: first, the Kingdom held celebrations of the 65\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Jordanian independence (Jordan Times 26/05/11). Then, in June, a mass celebration was held in order to celebrate the 90\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Kingdom’s establishment, Army Day, the anniversary of the Great Arab Revolt as well as the King’s accession to the throne in one day. Half a million people from all over the country were broad to Amman by buses organized by the Royal Court to participate. According to reports, this mass event “voiced support for progress in the country and reiterated loyalty to Jordan under the leadership of His Majesty the King” (Jordan Times 13/06/11 a) but there were also critical reactions saying “someone somewhere is orchestrating these expensive events […] drumming to the beat of loyalty” (Jordan Times 13/06/11 b).

\textsuperscript{14} CSS surveys are criticized for being biased towards the regime. Still, I rely on their data since they can at least give a hint on public opinion in Jordan and in the case of supporting protests seem to reflect what could be observed in Jordan during the Arab Spring, namely discontent of the majority with the ongoing protests which were perceived as distracting public order.

\textsuperscript{15} Of course, it is difficult to assess whether this was the case from the very beginning or whether this is the result of the strategies I will analyse in the following.
During his visits to tribal areas, the King tried to evoke traditional legitimacy and to mobilize his traditional support base by listening to demands and employing royal favours, *makrama*, which has “the connotation of a gift granted by a traditional leader” (Josua 2011:13). Josua (2011:13) concludes that this strategy has been successful since the King’s tour was not accompanied by protests except in Tafileh were local youth groups tried to hand the King over a list of their demands. Yet, the level of criticism of the monarchy has been unprecedented high and came also from traditionally loyal support bases of the Hashemites. On February 5, for example, a group of thirty-six tribal leaders issued a statement criticizing the monarchy speaking of a “crisis of governance” and calling for action against corruption by stating that certain “power centers (author’s note: a reference to the Queen) are plundering the country” (cited in Susser 2011:5). The authorities reacted immediately to counter these accusation by organizing massive expressions of loyalty to the royal family which were widely publicized in the media: no less than three thousand public figures and the leaders of seventy-five tribes signed statements repeating their pledge of allegiance and loyalty to the Hashemite monarchy and rallied round the King (Susser 2011:5).

Still, while directly criticizing the King is still of limits in Jordan, openly criticizing the royal family is a new phenomenon in Jordan which at least shows that, although traditional legitimacy persists, there is an erosion of a long term taboo: “Something has broken — some kind of silence. More and more people are speaking about the King” (NYTimes 19/07/11).

*Material legitimation* (IV-1-2) had sparked the protests and thus, the government responded by raising salaries and reinstating subsidies it had cut off before. In January, Prime Minister Rifa’i announced a $230 million package to lower costs of bread and fuel as well as to create jobs. When this failed to deter protesters, Rifa’i offered a $550 million subsidy package for fuel and staple products like sugar and rice (Hamid/Freer 2011:3). The King announced the establishment of the Tafileh Development Fund with $21 million to create jobs in the region. $211 million were earmarked for supporting economic development in all governorates (Vogt 2011: 74). This was an attempt to restore material legitimation. Moreover, the King embarked on a country-wide tour which was i.a. a strategy to allocate resources to the provinces and to grant royal favours (Josua 2011:13).

If this strategy was responsible for the scale down off protests is difficult to say. It could explain why members of unions, professional associations and leftist movements, who had initiated the protests with merely economic demands stayed away from protests later on while Islamist groups joined the protests later with political demands and are protesting until today.

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16 This was facilitated by an increase of US aid by $100 million, with additional $400 million promised by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (Hamid/Freer 2011:1,2) and a $400 million grant by Saudi Arabia (Schenker 2011:2).
Legal-formal legitimation (IV-1-3). The King’s reform promises were followed by formal top-down measures to manifest his commitment and to engineer the process and its speed and outcome from above (Hamid/Freer 2011:5). In March, the Bakhit government formed the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) whose goal was to draft reform proposals and to lead a nationwide reform dialogue. The NDC, comprising representatives from political parties, professional associations, civil society, youth and women’s groups, formed three subcommittees on the Elections Law, the Political Parties Law and constitutional amendments (NYTimes 09/06/11; Jordan Times 23/03/11). As the NDC and opposition groups kept demanding that constitutional amendments had to be part of any substantial reform, the King appointed a royal committee to consider revising the constitution. This “Royal Committee on Constitutional Review” was made up entirely of former Prime Ministers and other loyal figures and not one member of the opposition. It was rather questionable that a royal committee appointed by the King would strip the King of significant powers. And indeed, the proposed amendments only aim at limiting the power of security services, the establishment of a “constitutional court” as well as the transfer of electoral oversight from the Interior Ministry to an independent electoral commission.¹⁷ No important reforms were implemented so far and even if they were they would neither limit the monarch’s power nor would the proposed electoral or party laws make up for the fact that the Jordanian parliament is a weak institution with extremely limited powers (Hamid/Freer 2011:4). The only concessions made to show that the rulers are taking action include a reform of the Public Gatherings Law, now allowing for protests without prior permission from public authorities, and laws allowing for the establishment of professional association that teachers had long been fighting for (Vogt 2011:69). It is, however, evident that these reforms alone will not change the political system towards political liberalization. This fosters the perception that the purpose of these legal-formal actions was again only window dressing to manifest commitment to democratic reform without actually changing the regime structure. Yet, this strategy cannot be considered a complete success because the Islamist opposition kept criticising the Bakhit government and demanded real reforms which ultimately lead to the step down of Bakhit in October.

Symbolic legitimation (IV-1-4). The King rapidly employed a pro-reform discourse and took symbolic actions: since he managed to be seen as outside the political fray, he could use the government of Samir Rifa’i as scapegoat for all problems that protestors criticised. On February 1, the King dissolved Rifa’i’s government and appointed Marouf al Bakhit as Prime Minister (Schenker/Pollock 2011:2). In his letter of designation to Bakhit, the King

emphasized his commitment to reforms asking the government “to take speedy practical and tangible steps to unleash a real political reform process that reflects our vision of comprehensive reform, modernization and development. […] Such a process should enable us to proceed with confidence along the path of bolstering democracy” (Petra News Agency 01/02/11). On June 12, King Abdallah addressed the nation by saying that a future government would be elected within parliament instead of being appointed. He did however not offer a timetable and lateron backpedalled by claiming that political parties were not yet mature and organized enough to be up to this challenges and that the process could take at least two or three years (Hamid/Freer 2011:2). When the lack of reform was criticised, the King once again blamed the failure to reform entirely on Bakhit replacing him with Awn al-Khasawneh because of his “failing to push through reforms” (The Guardian 17/10/11). Also the King’s visits to all governorates are a not only means for allocation and traditional legitimation but also for showing that he is not part of a distant political elite but a humble servant of his people listening to their demands and grievances. Also other symbolic measures were taken to appease the protestors, e.g. the Islamist movement by staging a trial in absentia against the people responsible for the caricatures of prophet Mohamed (Josua 2011:14).

Thus, the King demonstrated to be prone to reforms and responsive to peoples’ demands but without taking significant action that would have changed existing structures. Diverting criticism towards the government is a successful strategy of symbolic legitimation: the notion that the problem lies not with the King but with those around and under him (emphasized e.g. by Marwan Muasher (2011)) is something one hears often in Jordan (Hamid/Freer 2011:5). The exchange of prime ministers and the King’s reform rhetoric, however, did not contain the protests as it was reported that the crowd continued to shout “No to Rifa’i; No to Bakhit. We want an elected prime minister” (Reuters 04/02/11). IAF leader Hamza Mansour pointed out that “with the choice of Bakhit, it's obvious that reforms have not started yet. […] There is no reason to stop the protests now” (BBC 11/02/11). It is however unclear whether this strategy only failed to appease the opposition or also common Jordanians. Opinion polls on the “so-called “reform process” would be needed to assess a causal link here. Lacking these data, symbolic legitimation seems to have had mixed results since at least the most active opposition groups like the MB did not buy into the King’s reform rhetoric.

Inclusionary legitimation (IV-1-5). The rulers made several attempts to broaden their support base by inclusionary strategies: in early 2011, the IAF was offered ministerial posts in the Rifa’i government but refused they considered it illegitimate. Thus, this attempt to widen the regime’s support base did fail. Note, however, that the IAF did not ever challenge the King’s
legitimacy (Josua 2011:12). Another only temporary success of inclusionary legitimation was the appointment of Taher Odwan, former editor-in-chief of Al Arab Al Yawm, as Minister of state of media affairs and communications and government spokesperson in February 2011. Odwan, however, resigned four month later as a protest against a more restrictive press law. The NDC, besides symbolizing reform commitment, was a tool of including influential figures that were not yet part of the regime’s support base (Josua 2011:11). The NDC helped to include them by giving them the feeling to be important, although their recommendations were not implemented. Yet, the MB refused to participate, stating that the NDC was part of the government’s “attempts to silence voices calling for reform and putting an end to popular movements in Jordan” (Ammonnews 15/03/11). Furthermore, 16 members of the NDC resigned after the violent attacks on protestors by so-called loyalists in March, leaving one person dead. They claimed that the inability of security forces to protect demonstrators had “uprooted any possibility of real national dialogue from its roots” (Ammonnews 25/03/11).

Again, the rulers were partially successful in including some oppositional figures but unsuccessful in including members of the Islamist movement and others. Broadening the support base through inclusionary legitimation seems to have had very little success.

Legitimation by threat (IV-1-6). Again, fear of a future without the monarchy was perpetuated: the media was full of talk about internal strife and chaos and even of civil war (Susser 2011:7). While promising reforms, the King made always sure to warn also of the dangers of freedom and democracy. When promising an elected government, he also underlined the “difference between the required democratic transformations and achievable ones on the one hand, and the risks of chaos and fitna (sedition) on the other” (Ammonnews 08/11/11). This strategy was successful because many people cautioned against rapid democratization as a process or full democracy as Jordan is considered to be too divided.18 A CSS survey shows that 55 percent of the population expressed that the protests would “lead to chaos and sabotage and undermine security and stability” (Arabic survey, cited in Helfont/Helfont 2011:90). Concerns were even voiced by political activists declaring that the King is needed to prevent disruption within the Jordanian society (Ammonnews 08/11/11 b).

Legitimation by threat was also employed externally: the fear of the West, exacerbated by the events of the Arab Spring, of loosing its allies and of regional destabilization helped Jordan to attract additional amounts of foreign aid and support: the US offered all in all additional $500 million. President Obama reportedly called King Abdallah II personally to reassure him of

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18 Concerns were e.g. that the Islamists are deemed to be too strong and would almost certainly get the majority in free elections; east Bank Jordanians are still too wedded to their tribes; giving more political power to Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who already dominate the economy, would undermine national unity.
his support and sent the State Department’s number three, William J. Burns, and Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to show the US commitment to its partnership with Jordan (Hamid/Freer 2011:1,2). But also Saudi Arabia, wanting to keep the Arab Peninsula and its own regime stable, were willing to pay high sums of aid to Jordan. But the Saudi monarchy went even further: they invited Jordan to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi Arabia has already provided a $400 million grant and the GCC pledged to give Jordan $2 billion per year over the next five years (Schenker 2011:2).

The rulers ensured internal and external legitimacy by causing fear of a regime breakdown. The strategies of legitimation during the protests show mixed results: the rulers managed to strengthen their already existing support base that did not rest to express their loyalty and caution against quick and all too comprehensive reforms. Yet, it failed to broaden its support base (Josua 2011:16). Especially the Islamist opposition did not buy into the legitimation strategies of the rulers what can explain why they are protesting until today while other groups were successfully included e.g. via the NDC and stopped taking to the streets.

IV-2 Strategies of divide-and-rule: Elite rotation (IV-2-1) with the aim of preventing alternative power bases to establish did not play an important role in early 2011. Exacerbating societal cleavages (IV-2-2). The authorities undermined the opposition and their demands by exploiting Jordan’s deepest schism and fears of Palestinians trying to take over the country (NYTimes 19/07/11). The perception among Jordanians, that Palestinian Jordanians are less loyal, was reemphasized by perpetuating that protestors were Palestinians and that anyone participating was to be considered disloyal. This assumption was solidified by predominantly tribal groups demonstrating to show their loyalty to the King. According to Naseem Tarawanah, this “created a diverging road where the population is slowly being split down the middle between those who declare their loyalty to the King and those who are critical of the country’s situation and are therefore, by nature of the first group’s existence, considered disloyal” (Black Iris 10/03/11). The fear, even of political activist, to be deemed disloyal led to a decrease in people taking to the streets and to a lack of unity among the opposition because Transjordanians did not want to be deemed allies of Palestinians. This strategy of pitting one group against the other and reactive underlying societal tension in Jordan helped to disperse the protest movements, thereby reducing its vigour.

Undermining oppositional demands (IV-2-3). The establishment of “reform committees” was also intended to delegitimize the protests because they could then be portrayed as still causing chaos on the streets even though they would have had the chance to participate in “constructive dialogue” (Josua 2011:12). This discourse proved actually to be successful: in a
CSS opinion poll in May 2011, a majority of the population outlined that they opposed demonstrations because they lead to chaos (quoted in Josua 2011:12). Analysts also concluded that the opposition had less ammunition to go on with the fight after the majority of their demands have been met by the amendments (Jordan Times 17/08/11), although this amendments were only proposed but not implemented. Oppositional demands were also undermined by denouncing them in the press as e.g. “enemies of the homeland” who shamefully served the cause of foreign actors trying to erode the inherent loyalty of the people to the Hashemite throne (Susser 2011:5). Stripping the opposition of demands and thereby pulling the rough from under them as well as denouncing them as enemies of national security was successful in a way that the public opinion more and more turned against demonstrators. 

Structural restrictions (IV-2-4) included i.a. the already existing legal obstacles for public assembly. I am not aware of additional restrictions implemented during the protests.

I conclude that the strategies of divide-and-rule were overall successful in delegitimizing the opposition, fragmenting them and preventing public support for them to grow. They failed however to prevent the mostly Islamist opposition from continuing protests with only some hundred participant. Thus, strategies of legitimation and divide-and-rule were successful in strengthening the already existing support base and keeping the average population from taking to the streets. Continuing protests especially by the Islamists can be explained by the failure of strategies of legitimation to broaden the support base by including them and appeasing them by reform promises alone.

5. Conclusion – Authoritarian Upgrading and Jordan’s Future

Protests in Jordan took place in light of the Arab Spring, fuelled especially by a failure of material legitimation. As I was able to show, other strategies of legitimation and divide-and-rule were at least overall successful in the past ensuring a broad support base for the rulers and fragmenting the opposition significantly. This can explain why the Jordanian monarchy was not challenged by the protestors.

Strategies of authoritarian upgrading achieved, however, mixed results during the protests: strategies of legitimation helped to strengthen the existing support base, consisting of its elites but also big parts of society. Strategies of divide-and-rule, namely exacerbating societal cleavages and undermining oppositional demands, were successful in preventing that average Jordanians kept taking to the streets. Both overall strategies failed, however, to broaden the support base and to contain protests by the organized opposition, especially the Islamists, who keep on demanding true reforms (Jordan Times 10/02/12). The strategies’ failure can explain
why these exact groups keep protesting. Due to successful strategies of authoritarian upgrading in the past, however, even they did never challenge the Hashemite monarchy.

I can conclude that my two explanatory hypotheses hold true: first, since the Hashemite rulers successfully employed strategies of legitimation and divide-and-rule in the past, they possess legitimacy and an undisputed power base within Jordan preventing them form being openly challenged by the protestors. Second, since the Jordanian rulers employed legitimation and divide-and-rule strategies, they were able to contain the protests.

Of course, more data would be needed to detect if causal links exist between strategies of authoritarian upgrading and the fact that the monarchy was not challenged and protests were contained. This is definitely a limit to my explanation. All in all, however, the concept of authoritarian upgrading was functional in explaining why the Hashemite monarchy survived the Arab Spring without making major concessions. Yet, the concept is fuzzy, and thus an explanation relying on it can equally be not as clear cut as one hopes for. Especially statements about the underlying understanding of causality or possible qualitative differences between the proposed strategies are missing. It might e.g. be that material legitimation is the crucial factor since its failure correlates with the outbreak of protests and its reinstatement correlates with the scaling down of protests. Yet, these inferences go beyond the scope of this seminar paper as the offered theory-based explanation is not suitable for a theory elaboration. Regarding the formulation of IVs, subsuming all strategies aiming at legitimacy under one IV was a good move as was the general distinction between strategies depending on their respective purposes. This helped to classify certain measures by the rulers regarding their aim and to show that the aim of one measures sometimes can be manifold.

To sum up, I was able to offer a theory-based explanation of the limited demands of the Jordanian protests and their containment which both contributed in my opinion to regime stability. The Jordanian monarchy has a substantial support base, notwithstanding some cracks, which provides it with better chances than other countries in the region to adapt to popular demands (Susser 2011:8). Its traditional religious legitimacy as well as its successful strategies of regime maintenance in the past ensures that even the opposition will not directly challenge it. However, the Arab Spring has left some marks in Jordan, too: the taboo of criticizing the royal family eroded slowly and the opposition did no longer buy into reform promises like it had in the past. The Jordanian monarchy will prevail due to its support base and traditional sources of legitimacy but it will have to make more profound concessions if it wants to contain the ongoing protests by the mainly Islamist opposition that does not stop to demand true political reforms.
6. Annex: Overview of Results

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategies of Legitimation (IV-1)</th>
<th>DV-before</th>
<th>DV-during</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional legitimation (IV-1-1)</td>
<td>Successful</td>
<td>Semi-successful</td>
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<tr>
<td>Material legitimation (IV-1-2)</td>
<td>No longer successful</td>
<td>(seems) successful</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal-formal legitimation (IV-1-3)</td>
<td>(seems) successful</td>
<td>Semi-successful (unsuccessful for organized opposition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Symbolic legitimation (IV-1-4)</td>
<td>(seems) successful</td>
<td>Semi-successful (unsuccessful for organized opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusionary legitimation (IV-1-5)</td>
<td>semi-successful</td>
<td>Successful in strengthening, unsuccessful in broadening</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimation by threat (IV-1-6)</td>
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<td>successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies of Divide-and-Rule (IV-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elite rotation (IV-2-1)</td>
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<td>No measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exacerbating societal cleavages (IV-2-2)</td>
<td>(seems) successful</td>
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<tr>
<td>Undermining oppositional demands (IV-2-3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structural restrictions (IV-2-4)</td>
<td>successful</td>
<td>No measures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 Due to lack of clear cut data on causal links
7. Literature


The Guardian (26/03/11) ‘Syria unleashes force on protesters demanding freedom as unrest spreads’ by Katherine Marsh, Tom Finn, Martin Chulov,


